

PATHWAYS OF PASSION: Aristotle, the Rhetoric of Passions and its implications in the discursive/argumentative context¹

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Abstract: *In the book II of Rhetoric, Aristotle points that emotions cause men to change their opinions and judgments. The present study examined this matter in a contemporary perspective to trace a scheme – which it is here addressed as The Emotions' Track – that discusses how passions take control of the human psyche leading men to action. A rereading of the emotions (passions) in the Aristotelian corpus based the first methodological step of this study. Then, grounded on modern studies on the subject, the way in which men is affected by the passions was pondered. Finally, a scheme that points out how it is believed that the emotions in the human soul work in a discursive/argumentative context was proposed. The method leded to the creation of The Emotions' Track, a five-step scheme composed by: I) Availability; II) Identification; III) Psychophysical alteration; IV) Change of judgment; and V) Action. The proposition of The Emotions' Track is expected to serve as a stimulus for the rhetoric researchers and will also constitute a shorter path in the face of the complex and unfinished understanding of the emotional universe and its consequences.*

Keywords: *Rhetoric. Emotions. Psyche. Pathos. The Emotions' Track.*

Rhetorical discourses essentially seek to awaken adherence in the audience to the theses defended by the orator. Therefore, in the argumentative game, any strategy capable of maximizing the persuasive reach of the argument counts positively for the orator and, as a result, arouses the interest of rhetoric, which is, in turn, concerned with that which produces persuasion in any given case².

In this persuasive process, one of the most effective strategies is the awakening of passions (emotions) in the audience. According to Aristotle, this resource works very effectively, since, when human emotions are awakened, they necessarily cause changes in the individuals who experience them and introduce changes in their senses, which alters and directs their judgments.

This extremely relevant subject in the understanding of the human being and of great implication for the persuasive process was proposed by the philosopher of Stagira in book II of his *Rhetoric*³. This article will bring this topic back to the present day and will analyze it through a

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3 Concerning the final composition of this work – divided in three books – Quintín Racionero (Aristotle's translator directly from Greek

modern perspective, based on recent rhetorical studies and developments.

This study's investigative course aims to reflect on how the Aristotelian passions reach and impact the human soul and, consequently, lead Human beings to action. To discuss such processes, the source of their reflections in a rhetorical context will be considered through the book the *Rhetoric of passions*.

Such title was given to book II of the Aristotelian *Rhetoric*, which here in Brazil received a bilingual edition (Greek/Portuguese) and was prefaced, with remarkable philosophical depth, by Michel Meyer. In the preface, the Belgian thinker examines the work of the Stagirite in a distinguished way, bringing to light reflections on the genesis of emotions from the dialogues of Plato to the description of Aristotle, also exploring the modulations that the discursive matter can suffer in function of the various rhetorical ends.

In one of the excerpts of his text, Meyer (2000, p. XL)⁴ states that: “a place where identity and difference venture themselves, emotion lends itself to negotiating one for the other; it is a rhetorical moment par excellence”⁵. In this bargain of identity to the detriment of difference, the emotive field gains a place where it can achieve the convincing and the persuasion of the other. That is, emotions, in an argumentative process, are bridges that allow the connection and the proximity of human beings through the identification of common traces between them.

Aware of the role emotions play in discourse, Aristotle describes, with assertive perspicacity, the passions that affect the human soul and make it subjugate. Thus, the master opens book II with the following reflection: “since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions [...] the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right **frame of mind**.” (Arist. *Rhet.* II.1, 1377b20-25). This excerpt already allows us to foresee the primordial function of the emotions, namely: to find or awaken in the audience the available emotion.

Following this line of reasoning, Aristotle sets out “that passions constitute a keyboard on which the good orator touches to convince.” (Meyer, 2000, p. XLI)⁶. Therefore, to achieve an effective argumentation that reaches persuasion, the orator needs to be able to access the emotional field of his audience through the proper use of discursive processes that can bring to light any pathological or psychological condition of those who witness his argumentative act.

According to Aristotle, human passions or emotions “are those feelings that so change men

into Spanish) explains that it occurred from 355 BCE during Aristotle's second stay in Atenas. The first book deals with the structure of the rhetorical art, the definition of arguments, and with rhetorical genres: judicial (aiming to accuse or defend); deliberative (which aims to discuss the usefulness or otherwise of a problem for a decision); and epideictic (that praises or censures). The second book deals with the human passions, the character of the subjects and the logical structure of rhetorical reasoning. The third deals with style, rhetorical figures and the composition of discourse and its parts.

4 All citations, except those of Aristotle and Solomon, have been translated from Portuguese or Spanish, since these texts are not available in English.

5 “lugar em que se aventuram a identidade e a diferença, a paixão se presta a negociar uma pela outra; ela é momento retórico por excelência” (Meyer, 2000, p. XL).

6 “que as paixões constituem um teclado no qual o bom orador toca para convencer” (Meyer, 2000, p. XLI).

as to affect their judgments, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure” (*Rhet.* II.1, 1378a19-20). In observing this reflection, we understand that the passions function as sentimental drivers that aim to introduce a state into a subject and then make his or her view on a given issue favorable to the speaker. In this regard, we also reflect on Aristotle’s view in the following excerpt (*Rhet.* II.1, 1377b25-30): “when people are feeling friendly and placable, they think one sort of thing; when they are angry or hostile, they think either something totally different or the same thing with a different intensity”. This excerpt confirms that passions have the power to alter the view of one who observes an issue, making their judgment vary according to the condition introduced into their soul.

Aristotle’s reflection on human emotions was of such importance that it has been retaken by different purposes by researchers of several areas of interest, such as: neuroscience, psychology, psychoanalysis, philosophy, linguistics and sociology. In fact, the philosopher’s remarks on the subject guide, directly or indirectly, new conceptions about the emotions until the present day. This fact justifies the incursions to the passional instance of innumerable fields of knowledge.

The Aristotelian remarks have been fruitful especially in terms of what Meyer (2000, p. XXXIX) states: “To Aristotle, [...] passions are intimately associated [...] with the sensible appetite, which is floating and consequently destabilizes man”⁷. Through this unstable transition that bases the sensitive human field, emotions gain the possibility of inflicting pain or pleasure on those who feel them. However, it is important to point out that, specifically in rhetoric, passions are understood as “a response to another person, and more precisely to the representation he/she makes of us in his/her spirit. Passions basically reflect the representations we make of others, considering what they are to us, in reality, or in the sphere of our imagination” (Meyer, 2000, p. XLI)⁸. Accordingly, in this field of knowledge, “emotions are related to transient situations, provoked by the orator; as a result, they are not understood as permanent virtues or vices”. (Fonseca, 2000, p. XV)

Since the discussion of the delimitations that comprise human emotions are being held, it is worth paying attention to the characterizations of these states, which the orator uses to change the dispositions in which humans find themselves. As Meyer (2000, p. XXXIX) explains in his preface, each of the passions seems like a whirlwind, a confusion that, though disorienting and highly modifying, is transient, mobile, capable of being reversed and subverted. It is a sensitive reflection of the other, which means, the bridge that connects humans through the emotional field. In addition, and above all, each passion aroused by an orator deflagrates much of the existence of the subject who witnesses the discursive act. Through the emergence of emotions, the individual opens the doors of his/her sensitive field, letting the other know his/her availability and, consequently, his/her motivations and values.

The importance of this instance to the field of rhetoric is clear, since knowing the values the audience agrees with, the orator can follow his argumentative path in a much more secure and precise way. It is in this sense that, as a rhetorical strategy, emotions are considered to be one of the

7 “Para Aristóteles, [...] as paixões estão intimamente associadas ao prazer e ao sofrimento – por conseguinte, ao apetite sensível, o qual é flutuante e por isso desestabiliza o homem” (Meyer, 2000, p. XXXIX).

8 “resposta a outra pessoa, e mais precisamente à representação que ela faz de nós em seu espírito. As paixões refletem, no fundo, as representações que fazemos dos outros, considerando-se o que eles são para nós, realmente ou no domínio de nossa imaginação.” (Meyer, 2000, p. XLI).

premises of the enthymeme (rhetorical syllogism). (Silva, 2013, p. 13)

According to the above, it is possible to understand that the passions constitute a framework in which the most diverse nuances of states of the human soul are inserted. The orator can and must enter and explore such structure to ignite the emotion that best fits the purpose of his/her speech.

However, before investigating the ways that the passions run through the affective field, it is necessary to describe each of them. To deepen further into this universe, an explanation of each one of the 14 passions presented by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* is given below:

- 1 **Cholera:** it is an impulse of revenge, caused by unjustified neglect towards the other or their loved ones. This passion rebalances the difference caused by insolence, displeasure, and contempt. It consists of the temptation to cause dislike to the other. Therefore, it refers to individual instances, to particular issues between subjects.
- 2 **Calmness:** it is the opposite and perhaps the antidote to cholera. It sets the state of appeasement after a thunderous torment and recreates the symmetry between individuals.
- 3 **Love:** it is to wish for someone those things that you consider good (wishing them for someone else and not for you) and try to make them happen at all cost. It is the bond of identity with the other.
- 4 **Hatred:** it is dissociative. It is the eagerness to want to hurt the other. Unlike cholera, hatred concerns enmity in relation to the overall, the groups, not the individual. Thieves, evildoers and executioners are hated: the groups, not the subjects. Those who feel cholera want those who cause them their torment to feel their evil instead, while those who feel hatred wish their target to disappear.
- 5 **Fear:** a pain or disturb resulting from the projection of an imminent evil that has destructive and painful characterization. It is accompanied by an expectation. Therefore, we fear the illness that can ruin us or ruin our loved ones.
- 6 **Confidence (security):** it is the opposite of fear. It is accompanied by the hope (anticipation) of things that lead to security as something close, while the causes of fear seem non-existent or distant.
- 7 **Shame:** it values the image that the other creates from us; it is pain or discomfort in relation to the present, past or future, which we believe will tend to discredit us according to another one's view. It characterizes the inferiority we feel in relation to the other.
- 8 **Impudence (shamelessness):** it also occurs according to the image that others create of us, but this conception does not bring us any pain, on the contrary, it creates

indifference that annuls any possibility of disgust. It deflagrates the position of superiority in which we place ourselves in relation to the judgment of someone else.

- 9 **Favor (obsequiousness):** disinterested goodness in doing or returning good to the other.
- 10 **Kindness (pity):** feeling of pain, considered to be a destructive or painful evil, which falls on those who do not deserve it. It is awakened when we think that ourselves or someone close to us could suffer such harm, especially when this possibility seems real and eminent.
- 11 **Indignation:** an understanding of the pain felt when you see the fate of someone who did not deserve it.
- 12 **Envy:** disturbing anguish directed at the good fortune of an equal. The pain is felt, not because you wish something, but because other people have it. Thus, it is related to the feeling of wanting to take away something from someone or to destroy something that belongs to another.
- 13 **Emulation:** it is related to the movement of copycatting another one. A feeling towards the goods or achievements of others, which we consider desirable and that are within our reach. It is a felt pain, not because other people have such goods, but because we do not have them as well, which impels us to want to possess them.
- 14 **Contempt:** the antithesis of emulation. People who are in a position to be copycatted tend to despise those who are subject to any evil (defects and disadvantages). Thus, contempt presupposes that the other does not deserve what he/she has because he/she is inferior to his destiny.

Through the passions listed, it is also possible to understand that, once these transitional states that transform human judgment are settled, a process is triggered for its due effects. The description of such a process constitutes the core of the present work.

When the 14 Aristotelian emotions are taken into consideration, a better understanding of the several nuances that alter the judgment of human beings is achieved. In that perspective, the theoretician Carmen Trueba Atienza, after studying the works *On the soul*, *The Rhetoric*, and *The Poetics* of Aristotle, elaborates an “Aristotelian theory of emotions”⁹. Therefore, it is effective to briefly reflect on the researcher’s propositions in her 2009 study.

Trueba Atienza’s work aims to reconstruct the fundamental part of the different approaches to the passions that are found scattered in the Aristotelian *corpus*. By analyzing and discussing the most recurring interpretative aspects in the present, the author investigates the various passionate gears (such as, for example, physiological processes and physical sensations). In addition, she reflects on the states and the cognitive processes to propose a cognitivist view of Aristotelian emotions.

9 In Spanish: La teoría aristotélica de las emociones.

The first proposition introduced is that, through the evidence left in the Aristotelian *corpus*, “Aristotle considers passions or emotions psychophysical conditions, associated with physiological changes, and involving sensations of pain or pleasure”¹⁰ (Trueba Atienza, 2009). These changes are not only established in the human soul, but also in the body of those who are susceptible to one of the passions. The meaning of pain/pleasure here extends to a field that runs away from the psychic, entering the sensory field. Once feelings of pain or pleasure are triggered, states and cognitive processes manifest themselves. That is, such feeling establishes a state of mind in who experiences it, causing the subject to create cognitive significations, such as: sensations or perceptions; sensitive or rational impressions; and beliefs or judgments.

Based on the manifestation of these processes, the individual, whose judgment and body have suffered passionate changes, is thrown into positions and determinations relating to the world and to the issue regarding the unleashing of the passions. In the end, it generates the desires or impulses that refer to the movement/action of that subject in relation to the problem that changed his/her emotional field on a psychophysical level.

Trueba Atienza (2009), from the Aristotelian framework, states that emotions are complex psychophysical conditions that involve:

- 1) changes and physiological processes;
- 2) feelings of pleasure and/or pain;
- 3) states or cognitive processes, such as:
 - a) sensations or perceptions (*aisthēsis*),
 - b) sensitive impressions and/or rational impressions (*fantasia*),
 - c) beliefs (*doxai*) or judgments (*hypolepsis*);
- 4) attitudes or dispositions towards the world; and
- 5) desires or impulses (*orexis*)¹¹.

According to the author (2009, p. 168), “Aristotle’s attention to each of these five aspects of emotions depends largely on their relationship to the philosophical issues he analyzes and discusses in the different excerpts where he deals with emotions or makes some allusion to them”¹². Each of these five instances is somehow constitutive elements of the emotions.

Regarding the third item of the scheme, the cognitive components of emotion can be separated from each other, but there are cases that they would admit combinations depending on the degree of complexity/intensity of the emotion in question. Thereby:

10 “Aristóteles considera las pasiones o emociones afecciones psicofísica, asociadas con alteraciones fisiológicas, y que conllevan sensaciones de dolor y/o placer.” (Trueba Atienza, 2009, p. 152)

11 Reorganized by the author based on the original work in Spanish.

12 “La atención que Aristóteles le dedica a cada uno de estos cinco aspectos de las emociones depende en gran medida de la relación que ellos guardan con las cuestiones filosóficas que él analiza y discute en los diferentes lugares del corpus en los que se ocupa de las emociones o hace alguna alusión a ellas”. (Trueba Atienza, 2009, p. 168)

fear could be accompanied by the perception of an object (the fire) and the impression that it is an imminent danger; of the belief that fire is of such magnitude that it can cause great harm and of judgment that we must flee at this time. [...] fear of fire would be accompanied by pallor and/or tremor; the sensation of pain; the attitude of alertness and the desire to be saved. (Trueba Atienza, 2009, p. 168)¹³

Using this example, the author demonstrates that the passional range of each of the components of emotion varies according to the nature of each condition and according to the disposal of the people and the particular circumstances in which they experience such emotions. Accordingly, it is necessary to use another contemporary author to better understand the instance of *pathos* within Rhetoric.

However, it is important to emphasize that *pathos*, along with *ethos* and *logos*, is part of the rhetorical triangle. While the former refers to the audience and to the set of passions they feel, the *ethos*' vertex can be related to the orator, that is, he/she understands the imagistic construction that he/she maintains of himself/herself; in addition, everything that remits to the image that the audience creates of its orator. In turn, *logos* includes all the matter that compound the delivered speech, that is, the evidence, the arguments, the figures, the examples, the language, the style.

Back to the first vertex (*pathos*), in the article "What is *Pathos*?", Francisco Martins discusses several meanings of the term, from its origin that is linked to the act of philosophizing, to the present day. Each of these definitions alludes to a certain field of knowledge, which allows multiple semantic connections between the numerous characterizations presented.

Martins (1999, p. 65) recalls that the word *pathos* (transformed into a radical) directs almost exclusively "to a conception of disease in its current medical form"¹⁴; hence, the terms: pathological, pathology, pathologist. However, the author emphasizes that the word had a philosophical origin and this is the main point on the approach proposed here. In this regard, the following reflection is productive on this matter:

The concept of *pathos* carries with it possibilities and problems that are broader than the sense of disease, not being part of a single field of study as the word "pathology" indicates. Inquiring more carefully one realizes that it is an essential human dimension. *Pathos* would be understood as a subject originating disposition (*Stimmung*) that is at the basis of what is proper to the human [emphasis added]. Thus, *pathos* crosses every human dimension, permeating the whole universe of being. Therefore, it would not be surprising to rediscover the *pathos* as being at the foundation of the philosophy that influenced all the construction of the modern world, and especially of science: Greek philosophy. Any and every attempt to elucidate *pathos* in a more thorough way would pass not only through regionalized points of view of specific areas of knowledge, but through philosophy as a whole. It is from the horizon

13 "el temor podría ir acompañado de la percepción de un objeto (el fuego) y de la impresión evaluativa de que se trata de un peligro inminente, de la creencia de que el fuego es de tal magnitud que puede acarrear un gran daño y del juicio de que hay que huir en este momento. Pero en cualquier caso los componentes cognitivos irían acompañados del resto de los componentes de las emociones. Retomando el ejemplo anterior, el temor por el fuego iría acompañado de la palidez y/o el temblor, la sensación de dolor, la actitud alerta y el deseo de salvarse." (Trueba Atienza, 2009, p. 168).

14 "a uma concepção de doença na sua forma médica atual" (Martins, 1999, p. 65).


of logos that an organizing panorama of this human question becomes possible. Consequently, it is evident the impossibility for pathos to become the object of study of a single discipline: it is an inherent concept of being. (Martins, 1999, p. 66)¹⁵

By means of this broader view of the concept, it is convenient to return to the primary conception of the term *pathos* and to take it, according to the author, as “an original disposition of the subject”¹⁶. And it does not stop there. Following the line of reasoning proposed in the article, this “disposition” also refers to what is not occupied, thus, that which is free, unimpeded. And this precise conception will be of use in the reflection carried out here, since we consider it essential for the unfolding of the emotional path and for a deeper understanding of the *pathos* instance within rhetoric.

Based on the reflections presented, we propose, below, a possible pathway for the passions, as we believe to happen within every persuasive process. The original contribution of this proposal rests mainly on the first two stages (“availability” and “identification”), which will, as we shall see, trigger the subsequent three stages (“psychophysical change”, “change of judgment” and “action”), already present in Aristotle.

Here is our proposal:

Figure 1 – Pathways of Passion



Source: Own creation

From now on, the characterization of each of the stages mentioned above – and that compose our reading the pathways of passion according to Aristotelian work – will be presented.

15 O conceito de pathos traz consigo possibilidades e problemas mais amplos que o sentido de doença, não fazendo parte de um só campo de estudos como a palavra “patologia” indica. Investigando-se com mais cuidado percebe-se que se trata de uma dimensão essencial humana. O pathos seria compreendido como uma disposição (Stimmung) originária do sujeito que está na base do que é próprio do humano. Assim, o pathos atravessa toda e qualquer dimensão humana, permeando todo o universo do ser. Não seria então uma surpresa redescobrir o pathos como estando na base da filosofia que influenciou toda a construção do mundo moderno e, em especial, da ciência: a filosofia grega. Toda e qualquer tentativa de elucidar o pathos de maneira mais aprofundada passaria não somente pelas regionalizações do ponto de vista de áreas de conhecimento específicas, mas pela filosofia na sua totalidade. É do horizonte do logos que se torna possível um panorama organizador desta questão humana. Evidencia-se a impossibilidade de que o pathos possa vir a ser objeto de estudo de uma só disciplina: ele é um conceito inerente ao ser. (Martins, 1999, p. 66)

16 “uma disposição originária do sujeito”

I - Availability

Within Rhetoric, the instance of *pathos* refers to the audience and its emotions. Therefore, to create a persuasive speech, it is suggested that the orator appeals to the emotional field of his/her argument. Nevertheless, this path is only feasible when the emotions of the audience are available for the orator to explore. Accordingly, it is necessary an affective availability on the part of the audience, which allows to create a space for the passion suggested by the orator. In other words, an audience will only feel a certain emotion (psychophysical condition) if it is open, according to its cognitive pre-disposition, to experience that emotion.

Consequently, the Availability stage concerns the audience's emotional acceptance and disposition to the emotions proposed in a particular discourse. In this stage, once the passion launched by the orator finds space in the affective field of the audience, the pathways of passion receives an endorsement to unbeatably travel the human-machine. Thereby, the second stage is achieved.

II - Identification

At this stage, a primordial aspect of the persuasive process takes place, without which, none of the subsequent steps would be possible: Identification. Through it, cognitive states or processes are triggered, such as: a) sensations or perceptions (*aisthēsis*) and b) sensitive impression and/or rational impressions (*phantasia*). At this stage, a coincidence with what Trueba Atienza (2009) has verified in the Aristotelian framework can be noticed.

It is also through Identification that the passions manage to exercise their "intellectual, epistemic function; they operate as mental images: they inform me about myself and the other as he/she acts over me." (Meyer, 2000, p. XLII)¹⁷. In this manner, it is evident that I will only be sensitized if I can identify myself first. When this happens, the third stage of the trajectory takes place.

III - Psychophysical change

At this stage, as a result of the identification processes and as being an integral part of the audience, I begin to experience changes and physiological processes followed by feelings of pleasure and/or pain as described by Aristotle.

Following this line of reasoning, Trueba Atienza (2009, p. 149), based on the book *On the soul*, states: "The psychophysical conditions of the soul seem to occur *with the body* [emphasis added]: 'value, docility, fear, compassion, daring, as well as joy, love, and hatred. Since then, *the body has been affected as a whole* [emphasis added] in all these cases' (DA 403a 16-18)"¹⁸.

¹⁷ "função intelectual, epistêmica; operam como imagens mentais: informam-me sobre mim e sobre o outro tal como ele age em mim." (Meyer, 2000, p. XLII).

¹⁸ "Las afecciones del alma parecen darse con el cuerpo: 'valor, dulzura, miedo, compasión, osadía, así como la alegría, el amor y el odio. El cuerpo, desde luego, resulta afectado (páschei) conjuntamente en todos estos casos' (DA 403a 16-18)".

Therefore, it can be noticed that a passion is not limited to an intellectual or epistemic function, as emphasized in the previous stage. Here it also strikes and interpellates the body, and leads it to a change of judgment together with the mind. In that way, the next stage has been reached.

IV - Change of judgment

In this phase, a change in the states or cognitive processes in the beliefs (*doxai*) or the judgments (*hypolepsis*) of the audience can be observed. This alteration occurs because of the change in the spirit due to the experience of pain and/or pleasure. As Aristotle reminds us (2015, p. 116), in this state, there is a noticeable difference in the judgments pronounced.¹⁹

In this manner, the conjunction of body and mind driven by the same cause can be observed. In this tune and instigated by the Change of judgment, the audience is summoned to act. Thus, the apex of the pathways of passion – the stage of Action – is finally achieved.

V - Action

Finally, the persuasive process reaches its ultimate goal, namely: that of leading the audience to act. As Abreu emphasizes (2002, p. 25), “To persuade is to build on the terrain of emotions, to sensitize the other to act”²⁰.

Therefore, at this stage, the spectacle of the attitudes or dispositions of the audience towards the world can be seen. Thus, in the Aristotelian path systematized by Trueba Atienza (2009), the audience may finally and inevitably give vent to their desires or impulses (*orexis*). This process reports the words of the Belgian philosopher when he states: “Passion, made unavoidable, requires action. Hence, the mandatory ethical relationship with passion, since moral is based on a just deliberation that is capable of leading the audience to action” (Meyer, 2000, p. XXXIV)²¹.

Accordingly, this is the only way the persuasive process can come to an end and allow the closing of the cycle. Therefore, at this stage, all the other preceding phases play their role and establish their importance: “The circuit is closed: there is passion because there is action, and this reciprocity is inscribed as the interaction of differences within the same identity, of the same community” (Meyer, 2000, p. XXXVII)²².

As a balance of the pathways of passion proposed, one of the most emblematic passages on the subject – which transits through the whole emotional path – will be remembered.

19 For that reason, Solomon (1980, p. 35) advocates that “An emotion is a necessarily hasty judgment in response to a difficult situation”. In this manner, an emotion is already potentially a judgment.

20 “Persuadir é construir no terreno das emoções, é sensibilizar o outro para agir” (Abreu, 2002, p. 25).

21 “A paixão, tornada incontornável, exige a ação. Daí a obrigatória relação ética com a paixão, pois a moral se estriba numa justa deliberação capaz de ensejar a ação”. (Meyer, 2000, p. XXXIV)

22 “O circuito está fechado: há paixão porque há ação, e essa reciprocidade inscreve-se como interação de diferenças no seio de uma mesma identidade, de uma mesma comunidade.” (Meyer, 2000, p. XXXVII)

Passion is certainly a confusion, but it is first and foremost a state of a moving, reversible soul always susceptible of being contradicted, inverted; a sensitive representation of the other, a reaction to the image he creates of us, a kind of innate social consciousness that reflects our identity as it expresses itself in the incessant relationship with others. A rebalancing that ensures the constancy in the multiform variation that the other assumes in society, passion is response, judgment, reflection on what we are because the other is by the examination of what the other is for us. A place where identity and difference are ventured, passion lends itself to negotiating one for the other; it is the rhetorical moment par excellence. (Meyer, 2000, p. XXXIX-XL)²³

Closing remarks

By means of Aristotelian framework amplitude and its undeniable impact on the intellectual advancement of mankind, this article had the purpose of revisiting one of his most important legacies: his rhetoric of passions. To this end, we sought to examine the work of the philosopher with the interest of a researcher of ancient texts, but with our eyes fixed on the present, since, from the beginning, our intention was to understand in what way his understanding of human emotions could lead us to an understanding of the argumentative processes present in the contemporary world.

As a result of this immersion in the Aristotle's work, we were able to propose what we call "Pathways of Passion", through which we broadened the persuasive path initially outlined by Aristotle and added to it two more preliminary stages that, as we have seen, provide the necessary ground for the blooming of the passions.

We believe we have fulfilled our goal and we hope that the "Pathways of Passion" described in this article will serve as a stimulus for the researchers of the rhetoric field and will also constitute a shorter path towards the complex and unfinished understanding of the passional universe of human beings and its consequences.

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²³ A paixão é decerto uma confusão, mas é antes de tudo um estado de alma móvel, reversível, sempre suscetível de ser contrariado, invertido; uma representação sensível do outro, uma reação à imagem que ele cria de nós, uma espécie de consciência social inata, que reflete nossa identidade tal como esta se exprime na relação incessante com outrem. Reequilíbrio que assegura a constância na variação multiforme que o outro assume em sociedade, a paixão é resposta, julgamento, reflexão sobre o que somos porque o outro é, pelo exame do que o outro é para nós. Lugar em que se aventuram a identidade e a diferença, a paixão se presta a negociar uma pela outra; ela é momento retórico por excelência. (Meyer, 2000, p. XXXIX-XL)

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